749UTXKI

2772

7 janvier 2021 14:14

7 janvier 2021 14:14

Biodiversity Offsets (BO) are activities that provide measurable ecological gains that are equivalent to the ecological losses induced by development projects. In France, BO have been very poorly implemented since their introduction in the 1976 Nature Protection Act. The new Law on Biodiversity voted in August 2016 specifies the implementation framework of BO and introduces more coercive rules. Provided that almost 60% of the French territory is dedicated to agricultural activities, farmers may be particularly asked to be BO operators. In this paper, we investigate through a choice experiment if farmers are ready to become BO operators and under which conditions they would enrol in BO contracts. Besides, we analyse how the agricultural sector specificities may involve preference heterogeneity for BO contracts. We show that the BO contracts requirements will not lead to a systematic involvement of farmers. This allows us to suggest direction for BO contracts to be proposed by planners, with regards to farmers’ profiles according to the types of impacts they have to offset. Les Mesures Compensatoires des atteintes à la biodiversité (MC) sont des actions assurant des gains écologiques au moins équivalents aux pertes subies suite à un projet d’aménagement. En France, les MC ont été très peu mises en oeuvre depuis leur apparition dans la Loi du 10 Juillet 1976 relative à la protection de la nature. La nouvelle Loi du 8 Août 2016 pour la reconquête de la biodiversité, de la nature et des paysages, dite Loi Biodiversité, précise le cadre des MC et introduit des éléments plus coercitifs quant à leur mise en oeuvre. Alors que 60% du territoire français est dédié aux pratiques agricoles, les agriculteurs devraient devenir à terme des acteurs majeurs dans la mise en oeuvre de la compensation écologique. Dans cet article, nous analysons par le biais d’une expérience de choix si les agriculteurs sont prêts à devenir des opérateurs de compensation, et si oui, dans quelles conditions. Nous cherchons également à analyser en quoi les spécificités du monde agricole pourraient engendrer des différences de préférences pour ces mesures. Nous montrons que les exigences associées aux contrats de MC ne conduiront pas à une adhésion systématique des agriculteurs. Ceci nous permet de suggérer des orientations de contrats de MC pouvant être proposés par les aménageurs, et ce par profil d’agriculteurs selon les types d’impacts qu’ils doivent compenser.

Biodiversity Offsets (BO) are activities that provide measurable ecological gains that are equivalent to the ecological losses induced by development projects. In France, BO have been very poorly implemented since their introduction in the 1976 Nature Protection Act. The new Law on Biodiversity voted in August 2016 specifies the implementation framework of BO and introduces more coercive rules. Provided that almost 60% of the French territory is dedicated to agricultural activities, farmers may be particularly asked to be BO operators. In this paper, we investigate through a choice experiment if farmers are ready to become BO operators and under which conditions they would enrol in BO contracts. Besides, we analyze how the agricultural sector specificities may involve preference heterogeneity for BO contracts. We show that the BO contracts requirements will not lead to a systematic involvement of farmers. This allows us to suggest direction for BO contracts to be proposed by planners, with regards to farmers ’profiles according to the types of impacts they have to offset. Compensatory measures for damage to biodiversity (CM) are actions ensuring ecological gains at least equivalent to the losses suffered as a result of a project development. In France, CMs have been implemented very little since their appearance in the Law of July 10, 1976 relating to the protection of nature. The new Law of August 8 2016 for the reconquest of biodiversity, nature and landscapes, known as the Law Biodiversity, clarifies the framework for CMs and introduces more coercive elements as regards their Implementation. While 60% of the French territory is dedicated to agricultural practices, farmers should eventually become major players in the implementation of the ecological compensation. In this article, we analyze through an experiment of choice whether farmers are ready to become compensation operators, and if so, in what conditions. We also seek to analyze how the specificities of the world agriculture could lead to differences in preferences for these measures. We show that the requirements associated with CM contracts will not lead to a systematic membership of farmers. This allows us to suggest directions for CM contracts that can be offered by developers, by farmer profile depending on the types of impacts they have to compensate.

None

• AB - Utile à l'AB
• FREDO durabilité
• FREDO environnement
• GEO France

15

04/2018

1 avril 2018